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1. Introduction 
1.1 The appraisal remedy as a new minority shareholder protection 
It is an established norm that companies are democratic institutions where the majority 
can subject the minority to its rule.  The power of the majority is not unchecked, 
however.  Company law has a history of developing measures to protect minority 
shareholders against the abuse of power by majority shareholders.1 
South African company law has recently taken further steps to develop new minority 
protections through the promulgation of the new Companies Act 20082, which came 
into force on 1 May 2011.  For the most part, these developments had their origins in 
the policy paper entitled South African Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines 
for Corporate Law Reform3 published by the Department of Trade and Industry in 2004.  
The policy paper emphasised the importance of having effective remedies in place to 
enable shareholders and investors to exercise their basic rights.  In particular, the 
paper stated that exit and appraisal rights should be identified and given content, to 
provide smaller investors the ability to make informed choices where they are unable to 
influence company direction and decisions effectively or to pursue private actions 
against the company in civil courts.  The appraisal remedy in section 164 of the 
Companies Act 2008 is the result of this particular recommendation.   
Section 164 allows dissenting shareholders, provided they follow the prescribed 
procedure4, to elect to be bought out by the company for fair value if the majority of 
shareholders of the company pass resolutions to: 
a) amend the company's Memorandum of Incorporation by altering the 
preferences, rights, limitations or other terms of any class of the company's 
                                               
1 For instance, under the Companies Act 61 of 1973 minority shareholders could rely on the oppression 
remedy in section 252 to protect them against unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable conduct by the 
majority shareholders or by the board, and could apply to the court for an order that the other shareholders 
or the company buy-out their shares. 
2 Act 71 of 2008, hereinafter referred to as the 'Companies Act 2008'.  
3 Published in Government Gazette 26493, General Notice 1183 dated 23 June 2004. 
4 Discussed in paragraph 1.3 below. 
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shares in any manner materially adverse to the rights or interests of holders 
thereof,5 or  
b) enter into a transaction contemplated in sections 112 (proposal to dispose of 
all or the greater part of the assets or undertaking of a company), 113 
(proposal for an amalgamation or merger) or 114 (proposal for a scheme of 
arrangement).6   
These resolutions are collectively referred to as "triggering actions" for the remedy 
contained in section 164. 
It should be emphasised that dissenting shareholders are not automatically entitled to 
hand in their shares and demand compensation under section 164 in the event of a 
triggering action. 
1.2 Philosophical underpinnings of the appraisal remedy 
The specific circumstances referred to above which allow for the appraisal remedy can 
be seen as situations where the relationship of the shareholders inter se and/or 
between management and shareholders in a company is subject to a "fundamental 
change"; in other words when power between those participants is fundamentally 
reallocated.7   
The appraisal remedy is considered by some as a means of softening the provisions in 
company legislation which allow majority shareholders or a group of connected 
shareholders to effect fundamental changes.8  Majority shareholders are given the 
flexibility to fundamentally change the company but as a trade-off the minority 
shareholders are permitted to realise their equity if they believe such changes will 
threaten their rights or alter their expectation of their investment.9  Essentially, in this 
sense, the appraisal remedy's purpose is to provide liquidity to dissatisfied minority 
shareholders who oppose a fundamental change.  
                                               
5 Section 164 (2)(a). 
6 Section 164 (2)(b). 
7 Kraakman R, Armour J, Davies P, Enriques L, Hansmann HB, Hertig G, Hopt KJ, Kanda H & Rock EB  
The Anatomy of Corporate Law 2 ed (Oxford University Press 2009) at 183. 
8 Manning B 'The shareholders appraisal remedy: an essay for Frank Coker' (1962) 72 Yale Law Journal 
223 at 226.   
9 Cassim FHI, Cassim MF, Cassim R, Jooste R, Shev J & Yeats JL Contemporary Company Law 2 ed 
(Juta 2012) at 699.  
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An alternative purpose of the appraisal remedy is to provide a means of ensuring 
minority shareholders are treated fairly in situations of fundamental change, especially 
situations which involve the acquisition of the minority shareholder's shares for a cash 
consideration.10  More specifically, it protects the minority shareholders from wrongful 
conduct by the controlling shareholder(s) or insiders of the company.11  In the case of 
an acquisition through a fundamental transaction in the form of a merger or scheme of 
arrangement, for example, minority shareholders can use the threat of the appraisal 
remedy to challenge the offer consideration if they believe it does not represent the fair 
value of their shares.  The existence of the appraisal remedy thereby provides an 
inducement to management and majority shareholders to ensure that any offer 
consideration approved by them reflects the fair value of the company.  In such 
situations the purpose of the appraisal remedy is something more than an exit right. It 
has a prophylactic function whereby it discourages a controller or offeror from 
oppressing the minority shareholders by imposing an objective standard of fairness on 
the offer consideration. 
As this dissertation will aim to demonstrate, the purpose that is ascribed to the 
appraisal remedy is significant in that it may substantially influence the manner in which 
a dissenting shareholder's shares are valued by the court in appraisal proceedings. 
1.3 Involvement of the court in section 164 proceedings 
At any time before a resolution proposing a triggering action is voted on, a dissenting 
shareholder may give the company a written notice objecting to the resolution in terms 
of section 164(3).  Within 10 business days after the company adopts such a 
resolution, it must send a notice in terms of section 164(4) that the resolution has been 
passed to each dissenting shareholder who gave the company the aforesaid written 
notice of objection, provided that such dissenting shareholder did not withdraw its 
notice or vote in support of the resolution.  If the dissenting shareholder satisfies these 
procedural requirements, and has voted against the resolution, he may make written 
demand within 20 business days after receiving the notice of adoption or the date of 
learning of the adoption of the resolution (if no notice of adoption is received), that the 
                                               
10 Idem at 720. 
11 For example, management could have been offered incentives in the form of new employment benefits 
such as pre-agreed bonuses or side-payments in return assisting with the favourable timing of the vote 
to approve the fundamental transactions and general support for the deal.  A controlling shareholder 
on the other hand may have been privy to inside information which assisted it in pricing or timing the 
deal. 
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company pay him the fair value of all of the shares held by him in the company.12  In 
the case of an amendment to the company's Memorandum of Incorporation, the 
dissenting shareholder must also hold shares of the class that is materially and 
adversely affected by the amendments.13   
Within five business days after the later of (i) the day on which the action approved by 
the resolution is effective, (ii) the last day for the receipt of demands by dissenting 
shareholders who received the adoption notice, or (iii) the date the company receives a 
demand by a shareholder who did not receive the adoption notice but who submitted a 
demand within 20 business days of learning of the adoption of the resolution, the 
company must send to the applicable shareholders a written offer to pay an amount 
considered by the company’s directors to be the fair value of the shares of those 
shareholders, accompanied by a statement setting out how that value was 
determined.14    
Section 164(16) provides that the fair value of shares must be determined as at the 
date on which, and time immediately before, the company adopted the resolution that 
gave rise to the aforesaid rights of dissenting shareholders.  If the company fails to 
make such an offer to a dissenting shareholder within the prescribed periods, or if a 
dissenting shareholder considers the offer inadequate and the offer has not collapsed, 
he may apply to a court to determine a fair value of the relevant shares and an order 
requiring the company to pay the shareholder the fair value so determined.15   An 
application to the court as aforesaid must join all dissenting shareholders who have not 
accepted an offer from the company as at the date of the application and the decision 
of the court shall bind all such other dissenting shareholders.16  In hearing such an 
application the court must determine a fair value in respect of the shares of all 
dissenting shareholders, subject to the principle in section 164(16), and may in its 
discretion appoint one or more appraisers to assist it in determining the fair value in 
respect of such shares.17 
                                               
12 Section 164 (5)-(7). The demand must also be delivered to the Takeover Regulation Panel 
(section 164(8)).  
13 Section 164 (5)(a)(ii). 
14 Section 164 (11). 
15 Section 164 (14). 
16 Section 164 (15)(a). 
17 Section 164 (15)(c)(i) and (iii)(aa). 
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The involvement of the courts in the appraisal procedure is therefore limited, 
presumably with the aim to make section 164 cost-effective and more appealing to 
minority shareholders.18    
1.4 The significance of section 164 court appraisals 
The risk to some companies is that if a large proportion of the dissenting shareholders 
elect to redeem their shares for cash in response to a triggering action, their election 
could financially cripple the company.  Such debility would be undesirable at the 
sensitive, post-transaction stage of a transaction when creditors will need to be 
reassured.19  The appraisal remedy therefore has the potential to constitute a financial 
threat to a company.20  Thus, in the case of a fundamental transaction where 
consideration is offered to shareholders the amount of such offer and whether it is 
recommended by management or approved by the majority shareholder, may be 
influenced by the amount which the company may be compelled to pay the dissenting 
shareholders under the appraisal remedy, however slight the risk, should the 
fundamental transaction be approved.  On the other hand, in such fundamental 
transactions a minority shareholder will be encouraged to use the appraisal remedy if 
he is confident of the price he will receive for his shares. 
Accordingly, should certain principles or methods of valuation be favoured by the 
courts in appraisal proceedings, such methods and principles will be relied upon by 
management, purchasers, minority shareholders and majority shareholders when 
making decisions in connection with such fundamental transactions based on the effect 
of the appraisal remedy.  
It is therefore submitted that the determination of fair value by our courts, and the 
methods and principles laid down in doing so, will significantly influence the manner in 
which the appraisal remedy is treated by purchasers, management and both majority 
and minority shareholders in certain fundamental transactions.    
                                               
18A court may only intervene in the section 164 procedure in one other instance, namely if there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that compliance by a company with subsection (13)(b), or with a court 
order in terms of subsection (15)(c)(v)(bb), would result in the company being unable to pay its debts 
as they fall due and payable for the ensuing 12 months (see section 164(17)). 
19 Manning op cit note 8 at 234.   
20 Ibid.  
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1.5 The valuation of section 164 appraisal shares 
The Companies Act 2008 does not provide any guidance on the method of valuation or 
principles to be used in determining the fair value of the shares of dissenting 
shareholders.  It has been proposed that the considerations relied upon to ascertain 
the value of shares under the Companies Act 61 of 197321, such as those in relation to 
compulsory acquisitions under section 440K and court orders for the buying-out of 
minority shares under section 252,22 may not necessarily lend themselves to an 
appraisal of shares under section 164.23   
This study examines the different share valuation methods and principles likely to be 
used by a court in determining the fair value of dissenting shareholders’ shares under 
section 164 proceedings.  The aim of this study is to make a case that section 164 
court appraisals are likely to be guided by the valuation methods and principles 
developed in section 252 and section 440K court appraisals under the Companies Act 
1973, as well as by the decisions of the courts in the state of Delaware relating to share 
valuations under the appraisal remedy.  Furthermore, that the purpose ascribed to the 
appraisal remedy will influence the application of these valuation methods and 
principles.   
A comparative study of valuation techniques used in appraisal remedy proceedings in 
the state of Delaware is included in this dissertation because of its pioneering role in 
the development of the law in this regard.   
2. Judicial appraisal under the Companies Act 1973 
Determining the fair value of a company's shares is not new to our courts.  As will be 
seen below, there were a number of provisions in the Companies Act 1973 which 
permitted a court to decide on the fair price of shares.   
                                               
21 Act 61 of 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Companies Act 1973. 
22 See paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 below for a discussion of these considerations. 
23 Cassim MF 'The introduction of the statutory merger in South African corporate law: majority rule offset 
by the appraisal right (Part 2)' (2008) 20 SA Mercantile Law Journal 147 at 168. 
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2.1 Relief against oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct in 
terms of section 252  
Section 252 of the Companies Act 1973 permitted a minority shareholder to approach 
the court for relief in the event that a particular act or omission of a company, or the 
affairs of the company were being conducted in a manner which was unfairly 
prejudicial, unjust or inequitable to him or some part of the shareholders of the 
company.24   
If, pursuant to an application in terms of section 252, a court found that the particular 
act or omission, or the conduct of the affairs of the company was unfairly prejudicial, 
unjust or inequitable, the court could, if it considered it just and equitable and with a 
view to bringing the matter complained of to an end, make such an order as it deemed 
fit.  The order could involve the regulation of the future conduct of the company's affairs 
or the purchase of the shares of the affected shareholders by other shareholders or by 
the company.25   
However, the most common form of relief sought by a complainant under section 252 
was to be bought out by the company or the other shareholders.26  This was 
unsurprising as by the time such a matter approached the court, the relationship of the 
parties had, more often than not, irretrievably soured.     
When ordering such a purchase under section 252, our courts endeavoured to make 
the parting of ways as equitable as possible, principally by ensuring that the buy-out 
shares were purchased at a "fair price" and that the company or other shareholders 
could afford to comply with such an order.27  The court would not order the company or 
a shareholder to purchase the claimant's shares without first satisfying itself that the 
company or shareholder was in a position to do so, and that an order to purchase 
would not render the purchaser insolvent or illiquid.28  The fundamental consideration 
though was the method and amount of the "fair price" valuation.  
                                               
24 Section 252(1) of the Companies Act 1973. Section 252 has been replicated in the Companies Act 2008 
in the form of section 163. 
25 Section 252(3) of the Companies Act 1973. 
26 Blackman MS. Jooste RD, Everingham GK, Larkin M, Rademeyer CH & Yeats YL Commentary on the 
Companies Act (Juta 2002) at 49. 
27 Idem at 50. Also see Donaldson Investments (Pty) Ltd v Anglo-Transvaal Collieries Ltd 1983 3 SA 96 
(A) at 120; Hickman v Oban Infrastructure (Pty) Ltd & others 2010 JOL 25176 (GSJ). 
28 De Franca v Exhaust Pro CC 1997 (3) SA 878 (SE); Re Cumana Ltd 1986 BCLC 430 (CA). 
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In developing the jurisprudence on the subject of "fair price" valuations under 
section 252, South African case law and academic literature have tended to rely on the 
numerous decisions emanating from the United Kingdom.29  This reliance was because 
section 459 of the Companies Act 198530 was very similar in form and tone to 
section 252.  As a result the law in South Africa on this subject was notably 
homogenous with that in the United Kingdom and, for that reason, this study has 
incorporated the decisions and financial principles of the United Kingdom in its analysis 
of "fair price" determinations in terms of section 252 buy-out orders.   
Courts in the United Kingdom were given a wide discretion in buy-out orders provided 
they achieved a result that was fair to both parties having taken into account all the 
applicable facts.31  Accordingly in the United Kingdom there were no hard and fast 
rules that were strictly applied to all valuations; rather, the circumstances of each case 
dictated which principles of valuation and valuation methods were most appropriate.32  
As a starting point, however, the fair price was generally considered to be the price of 
the complainant's shares as at the date of the court petition, had there been no unfair 
oppression or prejudice.33  There were also other circumstances when an earlier date 
could have been chosen, for instance, where the unfairly prejudicial conduct had 
negatively affected the business of the company, where there was a reconstruction of 
the business of the company or if there was a general decline in the market for the 
shares following the date of the court petition.34 
While in theory the court was invested with the power to compute the "fair price" of the 
buy-out shares itself, in practice, the court would hear and weigh-up evidence 
submitted by financial experts.  As in the United Kingdom, South African courts were 
reluctant to become enmeshed in matters of commercial judgment.35  The source of 
                                               
29 Blackman op cit note 26 at 51; Meskin P, Kunst J, Schmidt KE & Henochsberg ES Henochsberg on the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 5 ed (Lexis Nexis Butterworths Durban 1994) at 484. 
30 Companies Act 1985 (c 6), hereinafter "the Companies Act 1985". This section was replaced by the 
similarly worded section 994 of the United Kingdom's Companies Act 2006 (c 46). 
31 Blackman op cit note 26 at 51; Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd 1986 Ch 658 at 672. 
32 Davies PL & Worthington S Gower and Davies' Principles of Modern Company Law 9 ed (Sweet & 
Maxwell Limited 2012) at 743;  Blackman op cit note 26 at 51. 
33 Lord Denning in Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society v Meyer 1959 AC 324 at 369, reaffirmed by 
Pennycuick J in Re Jermyn Street Turkish Baths Ltd  1970 3 All ER 57 at 67. Also see Donaldson 
Investments Pty Ltd v Anglo-Transvaal Collieries Ltd 1983 3 SA 96 (A). 
34 Davies & Worthington op cit note 32 at 43 referring to the decision of the Court of Appeal in in 
Profinance Trust SA v Gladstone 2002 1 BCLC CA 243. 
35 Hicks A & Gregory A 'Valuation of shares: a legal and accounting conundrum' (1995, Jan Journal of 
Business Law 56. 
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evidence usually stemmed from expert valuers appointed by each party, and in some 
cases, the court took the further step of directing the company's auditor or an 
independent expert to perform the role of valuer.36  
When providing evidence, financial experts rely on a host of accounting formulae and 
conventions to support their conclusions.  Section 252 valuations, however, could be 
distinguished from market transactions and other share valuations as their ultimate aim 
was to provide relief from unfairness or inequity.  Accordingly, a number of specific 
rules on buy-out valuations have percolated from the case law, most important of which 
is the recognition that the market price of a share is not always the best indicator of its 
fair price.37  As Preiss J remarked in the judgment of the court of first instance in 
Donaldson Investments (Pty) Ltd v Anglo-Transvaal Collieries Ltd: SA Mutual Life 
Assurance Society38, the present price of a share on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange does not necessarily represent its true value, especially in the case of large 
parcels of shares.   
In light of this, other valuation methods were sometimes deemed more appropriate, 
such as a valuation based on the company's ability to generate earnings, historical 
dividends or net asset value.39    
The guiding principle remains that the circumstances of each case dictate which 
particular method of valuation is appropriate.40  For instance, Preiss J in Donaldson 
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Anglo-Transvaal Collieries Ltd: SA Mutual Life Assurance 
Society was of the view that the net asset value of a share was not an appropriate 
index for determining the fair price of shares in the circumstances before him.41  The 
Court held that the net asset value of the shares would place the disaffected 
shareholder in the same position as if the company were to be wound up with 
immediate effect, which in casu would lead to a price far in excess of the shares' actual 
value. The Court held that, in these circumstances, it would be more appropriate to 
                                               
36 Meskin et al op cit note 29 at 484,  Hickman v Oban Infrastructure (Pty) Ltd & others 2010 JOL 25176 
(GSJ). 
37 Benjamin v Elysium Investments Ltd 1960 3 SA 467 (E). 
38 [1979] 4 All SA 361 (W) at 383 - 384. 
39 See paragraph 3.2 below for a detailed consideration of these different valuation methods.   
40 Davies & Worthington op cit note 32 at 742. 
41 Donaldson Investments (Pty) Ltd v Anglo-Transvaal Collieries Ltd: SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 
and Another Intervening supra note 38 at 384.  
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assess the value of the shares on a dividend-yield basis rather than a net asset value 
basis.  
Earnings-based methodologies appear to have been the favoured approach to valuing 
shares in section 252 buy-outs.42  But the use of these methodologies was by no 
means uniform.  For instance, the question often arose as to whether dividends or 
corporate cash flow should form the basis of the earnings analysed by the experts.  In 
the United Kingdom there was usually a preference for cash flow where the company 
was a "quasi-partnership", that is, where the owners of the shares took an active role in 
the running of the business, and a preference for dividends where the buy-out shares 
were owned by a silent shareholder.43 
2.1.1 Minority discounts 
By far the most important question was whether it was appropriate to apply a 
discounted value to the buy-out shares of minority shareholders, what has been termed 
a "minority discount".  Simply put, minority discounts are the discounts applied to the 
value of minority shares because they do not entitle the holder thereof to control the 
company.44 In practice, a valuer chooses to value either the minority interest held by 
the shareholder, or the company as a whole divided by the percentage shareholding of 
the minority shareholder.45  The former valuation results in a minority discount whilst 
the latter does not.  It is worth pointing out that the quoted share price of a public listed 
company incorporates a minority discount given that the share price is quoted per 
single share.    
A minority discount should be distinguished from a marketability discount, which 
reflects the compensation to the investor for the inability to convert the shares to cash 
at a later date.46  Simply put, shares that incur large transaction costs or price 
concessions to sell are worth less than the same shares that are readily marketable. 47  
                                               
42 Davies & Worthington op cit note 32 at 743; Hicks & Gregory op cit note 35 at 66; Griffin S 'Section 459 
of the Companies Act 1985 and the valuation of shares' (1990) 11(1) Company Lawyer 16 at 16. 
43 Hicks & Gregory op cit note 35 at 67. 
44 Cassim MF op cit note 23 at 170. 
45 Wertheimer BM 'The shareholder's appraisal remedy and how courts determine fair value' (1998) 4 
Duke Law Journal 613 at 641. 
46 Booth RA 'Minority Discounts and Control Premiums in Appraisal Proceedings.' (2001) 57 The Business 
Lawyer at 14; Bajaj M 'Firm value and marketability discounts' (2001) 27 Journal of Corporation Law 1 
at 3.    
47 Bajaj idem at 3. 
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Shares are generally not readily marketable if there are relatively few shareholders 
holding the issued shares or relatively few issued shares remaining outside of a main 
block of shares beneficially held by a single party or small group of concert parties.  In 
practice, valuers tend to first value shares as if they were marketable and then, 
afterwards, apply a marketability discount to the assessed value to the extent 
appropriate.  
On the other hand, the price of shares held by a controlling shareholder reflects a 
"control premium", being the added value that a controlling block of shares gives its 
holder vis-à-vis the company.  A question that normally arises in share appraisals is 
whether the valuation of the minority's shares should be adjusted upwards to 
incorporate a proportionate percentage of the control premium derived by a controlling 
shareholder following a transaction.48   
Re Bird Precision Bellow Limited49 was the first English case which expressly dealt with 
the minority discount when valuing shares subject to an order issued in terms of 
section 459 of the Companies Act 1985.  The decision of the Court of first instance, 
whose decision was affirmed on appeal by the Chancery Division, held that the 
question of applying a minority discount is a matter of law as opposed to a question to 
be decided by the valuer.50  Further, given that the company in casu was essentially a 
quasi-partnership, it "would not merely not be fair, but most unfair" should the minority 
shareholder's shares be valued on the fictional basis that he was making a free 
election to sell his shares, and therefore at a discount.51  Rather, the method that was 
most fair would be to calculate the price of the shares on a pro rata basis according to 
the value of the shares as a whole, without applying any minority discount to the shares 
of the dissenting shareholder.52  The point of departure from such principle would be 
justified where the minority shareholder had acted in a delinquent manner which 
merited an exclusion from the company on a minority-discount basis.53  The Court went 
to some length to emphasise that its approach was not a general rule against minority 
                                               
48 Wertheimer op cit note 45 at 646. 
49 1984 1 Ch 419; affirmed 1986 1 Ch 658. 
50 1984 1 Ch 419 at 436A. 
51 Idem at 449. 
52 Ibid. 
53 See also the decision of Brownlow v G H Marshall Ltd & Others 2001 BCC 152, quoted with approval in 
Eastaway N, Elliott D, Booth H, Eamer K & Kennedy S Practical Share Valuation 5 ed (Bloomsbury 
2009) para 2.05.    
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discounts, but only suitable in the context of quasi-partnerships.54  The principle of 
discounting a minority shareholding would still apply if the company is not a quasi-
partnership or if the minority shareholder had bought the shareholding at a price which 
reflected its minority status or if such shareholding had been awarded by operation of 
law.55  A minority shareholder who had invested without an expectation of management 
participation could not readily expect to avoid a minority discount on his exit from the 
company.56   
Thus, when valuing shares for purposes of a section 252 buy-out order, a minority 
shareholder's stake in a quasi partnership should have been deemed to be equivalent 
to a pro rata value of the company, without a minority discount.57  On the other hand, if 
the minority shareholder held the shares as a silent investor it was suggested that it 
would be more appropriate to subject the valuation of his shares to a minority 
discount.58  Nevertheless, there was no South African legal precedent that specifically 
defined those situations in which a minority discount would be deemed appropriate in a 
section 252 buy-out order valuation.  However, in an obiter statement in the decision of 
Robson v Wax Works (Pty) Ltd59 Binns-Ward AJ stated that he could see no reason 
why a court in making an order in terms of section 252 (3) could not, in framing that 
order, give appropriate directions that the applicant's shareholding be valued on a 
basis or formula which would address the prejudice suffered by the applicant.60   
2.1.2 Effect of the articles and shareholders agreements 
Another factor that was considered in the valuation of the shares was the effect of the 
provisions of the company's constitutional documents or a shareholders agreement 
concluded among the shareholders of the company.  By way of background, it was 
common to find pre-emptive provisions in shareholders agreements and articles of 
association that required a shareholder who wished to sell his shares, first to offer his 
shares to the other shareholders before he could sell them to a third party.  These 
                                               
54 Re Bird Precision Bellow Limited supra note 50 at 450. 
55 Davies & Worthington op cit note 32 at 742. 
56 Hicks & Gregory op cit note 35 at 60. 
57 Hurter S 'Enkele aspekte rakende die waardasie van aandele by 'n bevel vir die aankoop van aandele 
ingevolge artikel 252(3) van die Maatskappywet 61 van 1973' (1998) 10 SA Mercantile Law Journal 
183 at 192. 
58 Idem at 192. 
59 [2001] 3 All SA 546 (C).  
60 Idem at 560 para [51].  
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provisions usually provide for the shares to be sold at a price determined by a valuer, 
who is either nominated by agreement, or failing such agreement, by an impartial third 
party such as the president of the relevant regional law society.  In some instances pre-
emptive provisions even go so far as to prescribe the methodology to be applied by the 
valuer when making his determination.   
It was submitted by Hurter that, based on the judgments in the United Kingdom, in 
South Africa a minority shareholder should use the voluntary sale mechanisms set out 
in the articles before approaching a court under section 252 for relief, and if the 
shareholder is dissatisfied with the outcome of the valuation, and believes it to be 
incorrect, the dissenting shareholder's remedy would be to sue the valuer for the 
negligent performance of his duties.61  In Hurter's view, to do otherwise would be to 
allow the shareholder to escape its commitments under the articles.62   
The question that has arisen in a number of English cases is whether it is appropriate 
for a valuer to have reference to such provisions when a court is assessing the fair 
value of the shares of an unfairly prejudiced minority shareholder.  The first notable 
case in this regard was that of Re Castleburn Ltd63 which concerned the removal of a 
director from the board who also happened to hold 44% of the shares in the company.  
A clause in the articles of the company stipulated that a director so removed was 
required to sell his shares at fair value on a willing-buyer, willing-seller basis, which by 
implication would result in the application of a minority discount.64  The claimant 
applied to the court for relief under section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 arguing that 
the valuation should instead reflect 44% of the value of the net assets of the company.  
In his judgment Baker J disagreed with the claimant, and held that the articles were a 
crucial consideration when determining whether the valuation had been carried out 
correctly.   Accordingly, the company had not unfairly prejudiced the claimant by 
incorporating a minority discount as it was implied by the valuation method stipulated in 
the articles of association, which was in essence a contract between the company and 
its shareholders.65 
                                               
61 Hurter op cit note 57 at 186. 
62 Idem at 187. 
63 1989 5 BCC 652. 
64 Griffin op cit note 42 at 16. 
65 Ibid. 
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The Court of Appeal in Virdi v Abbey Leisure Ltd66, however, saw fit to draw a 
distinction from the general principle laid down in Re Castleburn Ltd67.  In this case, 
which concerned an application to wind up a company, alternatively to have the 
petitioner's shares bought out by the other shareholders under section 459, it was held 
that the valuation methods and principles agreed to by the parties in relation to 
voluntary sales were not necessarily applicable to sales by unwilling and aggrieved 
shareholders;68 the point being that the right of a minority to a fair price would be 
significantly undermined if there was strict adherence to the principle in Re Castleburn 
Ltd69.  The distinction in Virdi v Abbey Leisure Ltd 70 was upheld and expanded in later 
judgments, with the effect that a section 459 petitioner in the United Kingdom is not 
automatically deemed to be unreasonable if he refuses to follow a contractual term 
governing valuation.71  Instead, each application was to be considered on the facts 
and, if merited, a section 459 petitioner would be entitled to an independent valuation 
notwithstanding any pre-agreed valuation methodology.72 
2.2 Compulsory acquisition of securities of minorities under section 
440K  
Section 440K was another section of the Companies Act 1973 which gave South 
African courts scope to consider the fair valuation of shares. 
By way of short summary, section 440K applied to affected transactions73 under the 
Companies Act 1973 and permitted an offeror, whose offer has been accepted by nine-
tenths of the shareholders of the company in question, to give notice to the dissenting 
shareholders coercing them to sell their securities to him on the same terms as those 
applicable to the accepting nine-tenths.  Such notice, however, could be challenged by 
                                               
66 1990 BCLC 342. 
67 Supra note 64. 
68 Shapira G 'Valuation of shares in buyout orders' (1995) 16 (1) Company Lawyer 11 at 14. 
69 Supra note 64. 
70 Supra note 67. 
71 See Re a Company (No 00330 of 1991) Ex parte Holden 1991 BCLC 597. 
72 Shapira op cit note 68 at 15. 
73 Section 440A of the Companies Act, 1973 defined an "affected transaction" as a transaction the result of 
which the "control" of the company would shift to a person or persons acting in concert in whom 
control did not vest prior to such a transaction or that such a person or persons will acquire all of the 
securities, or all of the securities of a particular class, of the company, or would become sole owners 
of the securities.  "Control" was further defined to mean the holding of securities in a company entitling 
the holders thereof to exercise the specified percentage (which was 35% under the Code on Take-
overs and Mergers) or more of the voting rights at meetings of the company, irrespective of whether 
such holding gave de facto control or not. 
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the minority shareholders on application to a court within six weeks of the date of such 
notice.  If grounds existed and circumstances permitted, the court could have either 
ordered that the offeror was not entitled to issue the coercive notice, or imposed 
conditions for the squeeze-out that were different from those of the offer.74 
2.2.1 Evaluating fairness in section 440K applications 
In section 440K applications the court was fundamentally concerned with the fairness 
of the transaction brought before it,75 and given that the value of the consideration was 
a useful indicator of fairness, the court's enquiry was usually focused on the true value 
of the targeted securities.76  The reported decisions in this regard have a heightened 
significance for the purposes of this dissertation, as section 440K was concerned with 
takeovers and achieving fairness for dissenting shareholders.  This is opposed to fair 
price determinations under section 252 which took into account the particular 
circumstances of a specific shareholder or shareholders with the aim of remedying 
prejudicial conduct and which were imbued with an element of restorative justice.  
The most notable point of departure in section 440K enquiries was the guiding principle 
that a court, when evaluating the fairness of an offer, would consider whether the 
consideration was fair from the perspective of all the members whose securities were 
involved, not just the disaffected minorities.77  In other words, the test of fairness was to 
be applied to the shareholders as a body and a court would not delve into 
considerations of whether it was fair to a particular shareholder in the context of his 
own unique or special circumstances.78  It is submitted that in section 252 applications 
the special circumstances of the complaining shareholder were usually the basis of the 
claim of unfairness or prejudice.  The consideration of such circumstances could not be 
divorced from the determination of the fair value of the shares of the complaining 
shareholder.  
                                               
74 Section 440K(1)(a)(i) and (ii).  
75 Meskin op cit note 29 at 987.  
76 Ibid and Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Co Limited 1969 (3) SA 629 (A) where the Court held 
the enquiry into the fairness of the take-over essentially tapered down to the question of the 
reasonableness of the price of 60 cents per share in casu. 
77 Meskin op cit note 29 at 988; Sammel case supra note 76 at 670. 
78 Re Grierson Oldham & Adams Ltd 1968 CH 17 at 32. 
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2.2.2 Approaches to valuation under section 440K 
It is notable though that in section 440K enquiries the courts did not tend to favour one 
method of valuation over others.  Rather, it was recognised that a valuation is only an 
expression of opinion, which may "be made on one of a number of bases, but the final 
test of what is the value of a thing is what it will fetch if sold".79   
A few valuation principles have nevertheless emerged from our courts.  For instance, if 
the target shares were traded on the stock exchange, the stock market price could be 
taken as a satisfactory indication of the value of the shares in question80 provided, 
however, that such indication was not conclusive, but merely cogent, evidence of the 
true value of the shares.81   
A point of difference between section 440K of the Companies Act 1973 and the 
dissenting shareholders appraisal rights in terms of section 164 of the Companies Act 
2008 is that the onus was on the dissenting shareholder under section 440K 
proceedings to prove that the transaction was unfair.  Given that at least 90% of 
shareholders had already accepted that the transaction was fair it was a heavy onus for 
the section 440K applicant to discharge.82  Conversely, in section 164 proceedings, the 
dissenting shareholder is not under any onus, but instead the court is left to determine 
the fair value of the shares.83 
2.2.3 Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Co Limited 
For a detailed summary of the approach of our courts to evaluating fairness of price for 
shares under section 440K evaluations, one need look no further than the judgment of 
the Appellate Division in Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Co Limited.84 
Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Co Limited85 dealt with an application by 
certain dissenting shareholders of the company Free State Saaiplaas Gold Mining Co 
Limited ("Saaiplaas") who objected to a notice by President Brand Gold Mining Co 
                                               
79 Re Press Caps Ltd 1949 1 ALL ER 1013 at 1018. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Re Grierson Oldham & Adams Ltd supra note 78 at 197, quoted with approval in the Sammel case 
supra note 76 at 649 and Mia v Anglo-Alpha Cement Ltd [1970] 1 All SA 11 (W) at 17. 
82 Blackman op cit note 26 at 155.  
83 Section 164(14). 
84 Sammel case supra note 76. 
85 Ibid. 
 20 
 
Limited ("President Brand") to compulsorily acquire their shares in terms of section 103 
of the Companies Act, 46 of 1926 (the precursor to section 440K in the Companies Act 
1973), following the acceptance by 93% of the Saaiplaas shareholders of President 
Brand's offer to acquire all of the shares of Saaiplaas for a consideration of 60 cents 
per share. 
Prior to making the offer for the shares of Saaiplaas, President Brand had entered into 
an agreement with Saaiplaas and its loan creditors in terms of which it was agreed that 
Saaiplaas would reduce its share capital and create and issue new shares at par to its 
loan creditors in settlement of its loans.  A term of the agreement required President 
Brand to make an offer to the shareholders of Saaiplaas for the entire issued share 
capital of Saaiplaas at 60 cents per share, which term was conditional on acceptance 
by at least 90% of the shareholders.  It is worth pointing out that at the time of the 
agreement, Saaiplaas had a large, assessed tax loss and was laden with considerable 
loan debts; but following the implementation of the scheme, the outlook of both 
companies improved significantly.   
In the decision of the court of first instance, the court found that the terms of President 
Brand's offer to the shareholders of Saaiplaas was fair and reasonable and accordingly 
dismissed the application.  In coming to this conclusion, the court a quo took into 
account the relevant circumstances of the transaction, in particular the history and 
reasons for the take-over.  What was most pronounced was the fact that the 
shareholders of Saaiplaas would have received nothing for their shares if Saaiplaas 
were liquidated on or before the offer.86  The court a quo had emphasised that it was 
reluctant to base its valuation on events that transpired after the date on which the 
shares were to be valued.87 
The court a quo held further that a court's approach to share valuation should be to 
place itself in the shoes of a "hypothetical intending purchaser" who would be assumed 
to have made complete enquiries and would have access to the accounts and other 
information which would be available to him, or, in the case of a public company, 
assumed to have access to its published information, such as annual reports and 
                                               
86 Idem at 648.  
87 Idem at 649; Trollip JA quoting with approval the following passage from Estate Duty Case No.1 (1958), 
23 SATC at 363: the valuer must "firmly reject the wisdom which might be provided by the knowledge 
of subsequent events". 
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accounts.88  Confidential information which would not in the ordinary course be 
available to such a hypothetical purchaser and developments occurring after the take-
over, should be ignored.  The decision of the court a quo also stressed that when 
appraising shares, the value of the underlying assets is generally relevant only if the 
company in question is expected to go into liquidation or the offeror plans to put the 
company into liquidation following the implementation of the transaction.89   
On appeal to the Appellate Division, the appellants challenged the court a quo's 
decision on the basis that an assessment of the fairness of the cash consideration 
should take into account the "profit potentialities" of Saaiplaas as at the date of the 
offer.90  It was common cause, however, that the improvement in the position of 
Saaiplaas following the transaction could be attributed to the implementation of the 
scheme and new subsequent developments.   
In responding to this argument, Trollip JA held that in assessing the fairness of the 
price offered, the court will concentrate on the value of the shares to shareholders of 
the transferor company and disregard the value of the securities to the offeror and any 
special or added profit potentialities that the company will have in its hands.91  
Accordingly, the enquiry is focused on the inherent profit potentialities that the 
company would have in the absence of the potential synergies in the proposed 
acquisition.  It was noted by Trollip JA that such a principle was well established in 
expropriation cases.92   
The Court drew the distinction between potentialities in the offer and potentialities 
divorced from the act of the offer.   Only the latter would be recognised by a court when 
determining a fair price of the shares under consideration.93  In conclusion, the Court 
found that on the probabilities evident at the time of the offer, the price offered for the 
                                               
88 Idem at 649. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Idem at 693, where it was said "one must ordinarily take the value of the shares to the shareholders of 
the transferor company with its own profit potentialities as at the date of the take-over bid, and not the 
value to the bidder with any special or added profit potentialities that the company will have in its 
hands". 
92 Ibid quoting Halsbury Laws of England, 3 ed, Vol.10 at para. 157: "The purpose for which the 
undertakers intend to use the land is not such a use as can be considered in estimating the potential 
value, when that value is created or enhanced simply by the act or scheme of the B undertakers. The 
loss is tested by the value to the person from whom the land is taken, and not by the value to the 
persons acquiring it". 
93 Idem at 692-693. 
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shares was fair and reasonable, and that the appellants had failed to prove to the Court 
that it was unfair or inadequate.94   
3. Principles and methods of share valuation 
The focus of a corporate share valuation is to determine the monetary amount 
attributable to a shareholder's proportional interest in the company.95  By and large this 
is done firstly by ascertaining the intrinsic value of the company, and secondly by 
apportioning that value among the constituent shareholder interests.96 The first step in 
this exercise involves a choice of valuation methods and principles.  The choice of 
methodology usually turns on the circumstances of the case and the order being 
sought from the court but, as we will see, certain methodologies are generally preferred 
by financial experts and foreign courts.   
After the first step has been completed, the focus is turned to the method of allocating 
the value among the shareholders.  This second step takes into account factors such 
as control premiums, minority discounts and the nature of the event triggering the 
valuation.97 
It is virtually impossible to give full attention to all the various aspects of share valuation 
in this dissertation, and so this dissertation will focus on the more important methods 
and principles thought to be relevant to the topic under discussion.  
3.1 General principles of valuation 
Before the most influential valuation methodologies are analysed, it is worth 
summarising a number of valuation principles which have come to be accepted in 
international valuation practice.98   
                                               
94 Idem at 694.  Incidentally, the appellants had also contended that an offer of shares in President Brand 
would have been fairer than the cash consideration of 60 cents per share.  The Appellate Division, 
though, dismissed such claim on three grounds: first, the values of respective shares were too 
disparate; second, major creditors would not approve the consideration shares; and third, Saaiplaas 
shareholders who wanted to remain invested could buy President Brand shares on the market with the 
money they received in terms of the takeover scheme.   
95 Krishna V 'Determining the Fair Value of Corporate Shares' (1987-1988) Canada Business Law Journal 
132 at 136. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
98 This summary has been derived from Vern Krishna's article in the Canada Business Law Journal, see 
Krishna op cit note 95 at 136 onwards.  These valuation principles are in addition to minority 
discounts, marketability discounts and control premiums discussed in paragraph 2.1.1 above.  
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First, it is trite that share valuation is time specific, that is to say the intrinsic value of a 
company and its apportionment amongst shareholders is determined by reference to a 
specific point in time.99  Most notably, the appraisal of a publicly-traded share by 
market valuation techniques is heavily influenced by the time at which the appraisal is 
to apply.  In this respect it is striking that the market value of a share prior to the 
announcement of a triggering action is markedly different from the value after the 
announcement.   
Second, there is the rule that hindsight evidence is not admissable.100  As seen in 
Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Co Limited101, our courts are reluctant to take 
into account a valuation based on data gained only by hindsight.  A valuation should 
focus on pricing a company's future on the basis of information available at the specific 
time of valuation.  One must exclude information or evidence that arose or became 
public knowledge after the valuation date.  By way of example, if a petroleum company 
discovers a large oil deposit after the valuation date, such information must be 
excluded from a share valuation, notwithstanding that such information may have 
influenced the future value of the company in the present. Hindsight evidence, 
however, should be distinguished from historical data available at the valuation date, 
which a valuer is perfectly entitled to rely upon when projecting the future value of a 
company.102  
Third, modern methods of share valuation focus on future expectations of the intrinsic 
value of a company.  Given that these valuations are forward-looking, historical data 
are not the sole or absolute determinant when determining fair price, but only an 
indicator.103  Rather, a prediction of value involves a number of enquiries, some of 
which are more concerned with historical fact than others.   For instance, it would have 
been absurd to have valued a bank's shares in 2009 based solely on numbers 
generated by its performance up until the 2008 global financial crisis.  It is for this 
reason that valuations are usually presented as a range of numbers each of which is 
premised on a variety of hypotheses.104   
                                               
99 Krishna op cit note 95 at 136. 
100 Idem at 137. 
101 Sammel case supra note 76. 
102 Krishna op cit note 95 at 136. 
103 Idem at 138. 
104 Ibid. 
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3.2 Methods of share valuation 
In the decisions and academic writing on the subject of share valuation, one often 
comes across the platitude that valuation is an art not an exact science.105  Indeed, it is 
quite common for multiple experts to hold starkly different views on a particular 
valuation of shares.106  Despite this, a valuer's findings are still expected to fall within a 
proper bracket of valuation.107  In order to do so, it is crucial that the valuer choose the 
most appropriate valuation method for the circumstances under consideration.   
What follows is a summary of valuation methods that have been applied by foreign 
courts in appraisal proceedings in the past.  As is apparent from the analysis, some 
valuation methods are more suitable to section 164 appraisal proceedings than others.    
3.2.1 Asset based valuations 
As a starting point, the net asset value ("NAV") method of valuation is based on the 
premise that the shares in a company signify a proportionate claim of the company's 
residual assets.108  The assets are residual in the sense that all liabilities and 
preference equity claims will be satisfied before a determination of value can be made.   
There are generally two approaches to assessing the value of a company's assets: the 
book value approach and the liquidation value approach.  As the name implies, the 
book value approach relies on the recorded values of the assets in the company's 
books of account, which values are arrived at by depreciating the historical costs of the 
assets in accordance with the generally accepted accounting practices at the time.  
This approach is considered inappropriate for court valuations as the book value tends 
to vary widely from the present value of the assets.109  It may, however, prove useful in 
setting the "floor price" payable for the assets owned by a company.110   
The liquidation value of the shares essentially involves substituting the current fair 
market value of the assets for the "book value" of those assets in the company's 
                                               
105 Idem at 135; In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co 607 A.2d 1213 Del (1992) at 1221. 
106 Tude B 'Sweden: disputes over the valuation of shares in compulsory purchase' (1998, Sep) 39 - 40 
International Commercial Litigation 52 at 56. 
107 Axa Equity & Law Home Loans Ltd v Goldsack & Freeman 1994 1 EGLR 175. 
108 Hicks & Gregory op cit note 35 at 62. 
109 Seligman J 'Reappraising the appraisal remedy' (1984) 52 George Washington Law Review 829 at 
848. 
110 Krishna V 'Determining the value of company shares' (1987) Company Lawyer 66 at 69.  
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balance sheet.111  In the past the courts in the United States have offered contradictory 
methods of determining the current fair market value of a company's assets.  In one 
judgment, the court ascertained fair market value by focusing on the depreciated 
reproduction cost of the assets.112  Another decision relied on current appraised values 
of the assets but refused to acknowledge the values of fully amortised assets with 
income generating potential.113   
It submitted that the most accurate method of valuing a company's assets would be to 
determine the current fair market value of each of the assets or asset classes on the 
balance sheet through the appointment of a number of specialised valuers.114  
Admittedly, this approach could prove a costly and lengthy exercise, being especially 
disproportionate and unsuitable in situations where large diversified companies are 
being valued.  
It should be kept in mind that the practice of asset appraisal is also not an exact 
science.  Asset appraisal is a hypothetical exercise involving the consideration of 
posited factors which can prove disputatious.  For instance, factors such as (i) the 
choice of the stage in the economic or seasonal business cycle when the assets are 
assumed to have been sold, (ii) whether the assets are appraised on an urgent "fire 
sale" basis or in the ordinary course of business, and (iii) the manner in which the 
assets are grouped for purposes of the sale, can all vary the outcome of the 
appraisal.115  
It is submitted that the NAV method, and the liquidation approach in particular, is 
unsuitable for determining the fair value of shares in a company conducting a business 
as a going concern.  A company that is both liquid and solvent should be considered as 
something more than merely an aggregation of its assets and accordingly be valued on 
a basis that takes this aspect into account.  The exception seems to fall in those 
situations where the company is financially distressed and on the cusp of liquidation or 
business rescue proceedings.  In such circumstances it would make sense to accord a 
break-up value to each of the assets.  In the case of fundamental transactions, 
however, where it is envisaged that the business will continue as a going concern, it is 
                                               
111 Seligman op cit note 109 at 849. 
112 Heller v Munsingwear 33 Del Ch 593, 98 A.2d 774 (1953).   
113 Francis I DuPont & Co v Universal City Studios Del Ch 312 A.2d 344 (1975) at 351. 
114 Based on the assessment of current practice in the valuation industry, following an interview with AJ 
Naude, Managing Partner BDO South Africa. 
115 Hicks & Gregory op cit note 35 at 62 - 63.  
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submitted that the assets should not be valued in a piece-meal fashion but should 
rather be valued in their entirety on a going-concern basis.  
In summary, it is proposed that the net asset value method of valuation is generally 
inappropriate for valuing dissenters' shares in section 164 appraisal proceedings, 
except where the company in question is in financial distress or where the NAV can 
assist in mapping out a valuation range for the court. 
3.2.2 Market value 
This valuation method is concerned with the price that can be secured for the shares 
"on the market".  In the case of private companies, available data of prices of recently 
sold similar-sized companies or businesses may be indicative of the market value of 
the private company being valued.  But given that there is no publicly traded market 
price for private companies there is no check on whether this data is an accurate 
indicator of value.116  Accordingly, the market value method of valuation is more 
relevant in the context of public companies in South Africa whose shares are listed on 
the JSE Limited.   
On the face of it, one could be forgiven for thinking that the quoted price of shares 
listed on a stock exchange such as the JSE Limited provides an unassailable indicator 
of the fair value of the shares at any given time.  Indeed, advocates of the efficient 
markets hypothesis would assert that shares always trade at their fair value on stock 
exchanges, making it impossible for investors to either purchase undervalued shares or 
sell shares for inflated prices.117   
The advantages of relying on stock market prices for purposes of share valuation are 
self-evident: they are easily accessible and cost nothing or little to determine.  But, 
whilst stock market indices provide a useful repository of empirical data regarding 
historical share prices and the market's estimation of the present value of listed shares, 
it is doubtful whether they should be the sole determinant of the fair value of a 
dissenting shareholder's listed shares.   
                                               
116 Hamermesh LA & Wachter ML 'The Fair Value of Cornfields in Delaware Appraisal Law' (2005) 31 
Journal of Corporate Law 119 at 132. 
117 See Fama E 'Efficient capital markets: a review of theory and empirical work' (May 1970) vol 25 The 
Journal of Finance 383. 
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There are a number of notable shortcomings of market valuations in the context of 
fundamental transactions.  Generally it is trite that the market anticipates the impact of 
the fundamental transaction which is reflected in the share price.  In particular, it is 
acknowledged that market prices may be distorted where the fundamental transaction 
involves a controlling shareholder.118  The market may factor a discount into the price 
of the shares in response to a perception that the controlling shareholder will 
mismanage the company's business, divert or underutilise the company's resources to 
suit its own ends or have the company engage in some other kind of opportunistic 
behaviour.119  A large controlling shareholder also results in fewer trades, less liquidity 
and in turn, a less reliable market price for the shares in the company.120 
The market value of shares is also at risk of being manipulated by the offeror or the 
board of the company in fundamental transactions.  These actors control the timing of 
fundamental transactions and timing is crucial in terms of market valuation of shares.121  
For example, a well timed offer by an offeror in a period of historically low share prices 
could result in an unfavourable market price for dissenting shareholders.122  Another 
example is of a board timing the fundamental transaction before favourable results are 
published, knowing full well that the share price at or before the fundamental 
transaction is not a true reflection of the value of the company.  In a more sinister vein, 
directors or other insiders may conduct the business of the company in a manner that 
intentionally depresses the share price for the purpose of a fundamental transaction 
and its associated appraisal rights.    
Another situation where the market value of a listed share is less convincing is where 
there is a thin market for the shares.123  In other words, where trades in the shares are 
irregular or out-of-date.  In such cases the illiquidity of the market counters the efficient 
markets hypothesis of fair value being inherent in the share price.   
One must also acknowledge that bourses are susceptible to irrational influences 
manifested in extreme cases in shareholder panic or unbridled optimism, which are 
                                               
118 Hamermesh LA & Wachter ML 'Rationalizing appraisal standards in compulsory buyouts' (2009) 50 
Boston College Law Review 1021 at 1034. 
119 Idem at 1035 and 1036. 
120 Wertheimer op cit note 45 at 640. 
121 Idem at 636.  
122 Idem at 636 - 637, referring to the case of Berkowitz v Power/Mate Copr 342 A.2d 566 NJ Super. Ct. 
Ch. Div. (1975) where a merger cashing out minority shareholders was timed to coincide with the 
historical low point in the market price of the company's stock.  
123 Seligman op cit note 109 at 843. 
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often unconnected with the earnings or asset value attaching to the underlying shares.  
As was noted in the judgment of the Delaware Court of Chancery in Chicago Corp v 
Munds,124 there are too many accidental circumstances influencing the making of 
market prices to accept them as sure and exclusive reflectors of fair value.  The share 
price of a listed company is capable of fluctuating dramatically over short periods, 
despite, in some cases, there being no meaningful change in the company itself or the 
industry in which it operates.125  The relation of supply to demand of a share on a 
particular day is the true cause of the market value of the share; and temporary supply 
and demand are in turn affected by numerous circumstances which are completely 
disconnected from considerations related to the share's intrinsic worth.126     
In view of the above, one might conclude that there are too many potential accidental 
and intentional factors entering into the construction of market prices to accept them as 
"sure and exclusive reflectors of fair value".127  It is submitted, however, that the 
importance of market value in court appraisals in South Africa will mostly depend on 
the nature of the market for the shares and, to a large extent, the prevailing judicial 
view of the purpose of the appraisal remedy and the approach of financial experts to 
share valuations.128    
3.2.3 Discounted cash flow 
The discounted cash flow ("DCF") method of valuation is based on the theory that the 
value of a business or asset depends on the expected future net cash flows of that 
business or asset determined with reference to the cost of capital or discount rate.129  
The method applied consists of three distinct components: first, an estimation of net 
cash flows that the company will generate, and when, over some period; second, a 
terminal or residual value equal as at the end of projection period, which represents the 
value of the company's cash flows thereafter; and lastly, a cost of capital with which to 
discount to a present value both the projected net cash flows and the estimated 
                                               
124 Del Ch 172 A 452 (1934) at 455. 
125 Wertheimer op cit note 45 at 635.  An example of a dramatic fluctuation was seen in the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange all share index for the 21-week period from 24 May 2012 to 18 October 2012 which 
exhibited a low of R33 046.13 and a high of R37 051.95  Business Day website 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/markets/ accessed on 20 October 2012. 
126 Supra note 124 at 455. 
127 Ibid. 
128 See the discussion in paragraph 6.3 below. 
129 Hicks & Gregory op cit note 35 at 63; Krishna op cit note 110 at 70.   
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terminal of residual value.130  In simple terms, the process of discounting is essentially 
the converse of compounding.131   
The "cost of capital" or "discount rate" is theoretically the rate of return that suppliers of 
capital – bondholders, lenders and owners – require as compensation for the 
contribution of their money or capital.132  Given that a company has a number of 
sources for raising capital, such as loan financing from a financial institution or issuing 
securities such as bonds or preferred or ordinary shares, the cost of capital usually 
reflects each component cost of capital, which, when weighted accordingly for the 
company, is known as the weighted average cost of capital ("WACC") of the company.   
Discounted cash flow valuation can be explained more easily by the use of an 
example.  Assume for purposes of this example that the WACC, that is, the cost of 
capital, is constant for the period under discussion.  An investor, X, is owed an amount 
of R133 100 by Y which is payable in three years' time.  X has other funds which he 
has invested at a current rate of interest of 10% per annum.  If Y wishes to settle the 
loan in full today, it is obvious that Y should not offer to pay back the full amount of 
R133 100 to X, because such amount does not reflect the present value of the loan.  If 
X had the cash today he could invest it and expect to receive a return on the 
investment in line with his other investments which are increasing at a rate of 10% per 
annum, understood as a rate of return of 1.1 on the principal amount per annum which 
extrapolates to a rate of 1.331 over a period of three years.  In other words, if X had to 
invest R100 today at the rate of interest of 10% per annum he can expect to receive 
R133.10 at the end of the third year.  In order to reach a present value we must 
therefore discount the future value or R133 100 by the expected rate of interest for the 
three year period, being 1.331.  Accordingly, we divide the sum of R133 100 by 1.331 
to reach a present value of R100 000.   
                                               
130 Thompson 'A lawyer's guide to modern valuation techniques in mergers and acquisitions' (1996) 21 
Journal of Corporation Law 457 at 464 & 465, quoting the decision of Cede & Co. Technicolor, Inc. 
1990 WL 161084 Del. Ch. Oct. 19, (1990) at 7. 
131 Krishna op cit note 110 at 70. 
132 Chartered Financial Analyst ("CFA") Program Curriculum Corporate Finance and Portfolio 
Management CFA Institute Volume 4 (Pearson 2008) at 38. 
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This example of the use of discounting to reach a present value can be reduced to the 
following formula: 
P = 
F 
(1+i)ⁿ 
 where  P = present value 
   F = future value 
   i = rate of interest per year 
   n = number of years 
which is the converse of the formula for reaching future value by compounding, 
namely: 
 F =  P (1+i)ⁿ 
There are a number of drawbacks to the DCF method of valuation.  The first drawback 
is the assumption that the discount rate remains constant over the relevant period.  The 
use of WACC as the cost of capital or discount rate is only suitable where the capital 
structure of the target or merged company is stable over time.133  If the WACC 
fluctuates over the relevant period it will be an imprecise reflection of the company's 
cost of capital.  For the purposes of this study it is worth noting that the WACC is 
susceptible to change following a fundamental transaction given the propensity of the 
target to change its capital structure or debt/equity ratios following implementation.  
This is most pronounced in acquisitions that impose a high level of debt on the target 
post implementation.  Accordingly, the assumption that the cost of capital or WACC is 
likely to remain constant is unrealistic.  
This is an important consideration in leveraged transactions given that the use of a 
constant WACC based on the first year's leverage ratio when the capital structure of a 
company is changing usually leads to an overvaluation of a minority's shares.134  This 
is because a WACC calculation based on too much debt, which typically has a lower 
cost than equity, will result in a lower WACC with the effect that the cash flows will be 
higher giving an elevated value to the shares.135  Admittedly, expert witnesses could 
                                               
133 Subramanian G 'Note, Using Capital Cash Flows to Value Dissenters' Shares in Appraisal 
Proceedings' (1998) 111 Harvard Law Review 2099 at 2106. 
134 Idem at 2106.  This is put down to (i) calculating the interest tax shield based on the first year's 
leverage ratio will overstate its value, and the benefits of the interest rate tax shield is included in the 
discount rate; and (ii) using an unduly high leverage ratio will understate the WACC because the after-
tax cost of debt is typically lower than the cost of equity.  
135 Subramanian op cit note 133 at 2106.  
 31 
 
correct this imbalance by permitting the WACC to change from year to year but such 
assumptions are liable to lead to further disputes.136 
The other major drawback of DCF valuations is the wide spectrum of outcomes that 
may result from a slight difference in the cash flow forecasts or the discount rate used 
in the formula.137  It is understood that estimating cash flows is a problematical task as 
it requires the valuer to consider both the rate of growth and the duration of growth 
expected of the cash flows of the company.138  As a consequence a valuer may 
justifiably arrive at a number of cash flow forecasts, each of which when included in the 
formula can have a significant impact on the result.   
Of more concern though is the impact on price when the discount rate is changed.  For 
example, if the valuation is performed over a five-year period, a 1% change in the 
discount rate or WACC will reduce the value of the shares by 5%.139  As noted in the 
United States case of Cede & Co. v Technicolor, Inc, experts using the same historical 
data in separate DCF valuations can arrive at results covering an astonishing range, 
from $13.14 per share to $62.75 per share, as was heard by the Court in that case.140 
In summary, whilst it is probably the most academically renowned form of financial 
valuation, the DCF model is imperfect in two respects: first, it is susceptible to diverging 
assumptions about the future and second, there are different methods of generating 
inputs for inclusion in the model.  Regrettably, there is no case law or legislation in 
South Africa that provides a yardstick as to what assumptions or inputs are to be used 
in such valuations.   
3.2.4 Earnings-multiple approach  
In practice, valuers often use relative valuation techniques to determine the going 
concern value of a company.141  Many valuers use such techniques in conjunction with 
the discounted cash flow valuation models, given that it is possible to use the DCF 
method to arrive at values that are significantly above or below prevailing prices in the 
market depending on how the valuer adjusts his assumptions to the prevailing 
                                               
136 Idem at 2107.  
137 Ibid. 
138 Krishna op cit note 110 at 70. 
139 Subramanian op cit note 133 at 2107. 
140 Cede & Co. v Technicolor, Inc supra note 130 at 7.   
141 Hicks & Gregory op cit note 35 at 62. 
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environment.142  The benefit of relative evaluation models, such as the earnings-
multiple approach, is that they incorporate information about how the market is 
presently valuing shares which information combines a number of factors, such as the 
aggregate market, alternative industries and individual stocks within industries.143 
The earnings-multiple approach involves the determination of the net earnings of the 
company and applying the price-earnings ratio ("PER") of shares in similar companies 
in the same industry, which provide a marker of how much investors are willing to pay 
upfront for expected earnings in the future.144  The purpose of such method is to apply 
appropriate analogues to the company being valued to arrive at an estimate of the 
value of the company as if it were traded on a stock exchange.145  
The first shortcoming of this technique is that it relies on current valuation data which 
do not acknowledge that the market valuation may be too high or too low at the 
particular point in time of the valuation.146  The second shortcoming is that it is 
inappropriate when valuing smaller and unlisted companies to use the PER of larger 
companies, given that a smaller company's costs of capital are generally higher than 
those of a large company which would ordinarily result in a lower PER.147  Accordingly, 
it is a common practice of valuers to apply a discount to the valuation of a small, 
unlisted company when using the PER of listed companies, as a means to 
acknowledge the lack of marketability of the unlisted company's shares.148  
Unfortunately, the amount of discount to be applied in this situation may lead to a 
dispute between different valuers.  
In view of the above, it is submitted that relative valuation techniques could only be 
suitable in appraisal proceedings where, firstly, the valuer has access to information on 
a similar group of comparable companies which are analogous in respect of size, 
                                               
142  Chartered Financial Analyst ("CFA") Program Equity and Fixed Income CFA Institute Volume 5 
(Pearson 2008) at 176.  
143  Ibid. 
144  Hicks & Gregory op cit note 35 at 65 & CFA Program Curriculum op cit note 142 at 186. 
145  Hicks & Gregory op cit note 35 at 65. 
146  CFA Program Curriculum op cit note 142 at 176.  The concerns in this regard are similar to those 
canvassed in para 3.2.2 above, dealing with market related valuations.   
147  Hicks & Gregory op cit note 35 at 65. 
148  Ibid.  
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industry and risk and, secondly, the industry in which the company operates is not at 
risk of being considerably overvalued or undervalued at the time of valuation.149 
3.2.5 Delaware block method 
The Delaware block (or weighted average) method was a doctrine of valuation 
developed by the Delaware courts on the premise that no one method is conclusive of 
value and that each method should carry some weight.150  Under the Delaware block 
method the value of a company is determined by assigning a weight to a number of 
factors to obtain a weighted average share value.  The weighted factors are generally: 
a) the market value of the company before the triggering action; 
b) the value of the company determined by the earnings-multiple 
valuation technique discussed above; 
c) the net asset value of the company; and 
d) the value of the company based on its past dividend yield.151 
The respective weightings assigned to each of the factors listed above are to be 
dictated by the surrounding circumstances of each valuation.   
An academic on corporate law in the United States has gone as far as to label the 
Delaware block method as one that no professional analyst would deem acceptable.152   
As will be seen in the following paragraphs, the Delaware block method has fallen out 
of favour in the courts of the United States.  
4. The US approach to appraisal remedy valuations 
The appraisal remedy is not unique to South Africa.  Canada153 and New Zealand154, 
as well as all the states in the United States of America155, have adopted legislation 
which provides an appraisal remedy to minority shareholders in certain situations of 
                                               
149 CFA Program Curriculum op cit note 142 at 176. 
150 Krishna op cit note 95 at 157. 
151 Thompson op cit note 130 at 463.  
152 Idem at 464.  
153 Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985 C.- 44. 
154 New Zealand Companies Act, 105 of 1993. 
155 See analysis in par 4 below. 
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fundamental change in the company.  Furthermore, out of all the states in the United 
States, the state of Delaware has contributed more than any other to the development 
of the law in respect of the appraisal remedy, especially with regard to the principles 
governing share valuations.156 This hegemony is hardly surprising given that more than 
50% of all publicly traded companies in the United States are registered in Delaware.157   
It is instructive to note that historically Canadian and New Zealand courts have 
generally followed the decisions of the Supreme Court of Delaware regarding share 
appraisals.158  Accordingly, given this trend and the appraisal remedy’s relative novelty 
in South African law, it is submitted that South African courts can be expected to do 
likewise.159  As such, it seems appropriate for this paper to concentrate on the 
valuation principles and methods arising from the courts in Delaware.  
The appraisal remedy has existed in the United States in a number of state corporation 
statutes since the late 19th century.160  Today all 50 states in the United States, as well 
as the District of Colombia, provide for an appraisal remedy in one form or another.161  
Whilst the provisions of the relevant state statutes may differ in scope, on the whole 
they provide shareholders with the means to cash out their shares in certain defined 
situations for a price equal to the value of shares.   
In a number of states the remedy's origin is regarded as a trade-off arising from the 
transition from the requirement of unanimous shareholder approval for certain 
fundamental changes, to the requirement that only majority or super majority 
shareholder approval be obtained.  The remedy was seen as a means of compensating 
the individual shareholder for his loss of veto power over fundamental changes.162  In 
addition to this historical reason, the appraisal remedy also came to be seen as 
                                               
156 Schwenk MR 'Valuation problems in the appraisal remedy' (1994) 16 Cardozo Law Review 649 at 673. 
157 See www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml last accessed on 7 January 2014. 
158 Cassim MF op cit note 23 at 168.  
159 It should be noted that the Delaware Corporation Law Del. Code Ann tit 8, only grants appraisal rights 
to a dissenter in the event of a merger or consolidation.  Appraisal rights do not apply to transactions 
where a majority or all of a company's assets are sold or the constitutional documents of the company 
are amended, as is the case under section 164 in the Companies Act 2008.  
160 Wertheimer op cit note 45 at 616. 
161 Seligman op cit note 109 at 832.  
162 Wertheimer op cit note 45 at 614. 
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performing a liquidity function for minority shareholders who, against their wishes, were 
locked into companies which had undergone a fundamental change.163   
Once the concept of majority rule in corporate affairs had become firmly entrenched in 
the United States, however, American jurists began to criticise the historical purpose of 
the appraisal remedy.  Most pronounced of these critics was Manning who, in his 
seminal journal article of 1962, argued that the only justifiable rationale for the 
appraisal remedy was as an economic substitute for the stock exchange, and 
accordingly, its use should be limited to situations where an exchange or some other 
kind of reasonable market is unavailable.164  In other words, the only acceptable 
purpose for the appraisal remedy was to perform a liquidity function for private, unlisted 
companies.  In the years following Manning's article the appraisal remedy fell out of 
favour with the courts and a number of states adopted a stock-market exception that 
prevented the use of the appraisal remedy by shareholders in listed companies.165   
Notwithstanding these events, the US capital markets began to revolutionise in the last 
third of the 20th century and the use of fundamental transactions in business activity 
became more frequent and pronounced.  These developments, coupled with a move 
from reliance on remedies in federal securities law to remedies in state legislation, 
brought the appraisal remedy to the attention of academics and businessmen who 
recognised it as an underutilised resource for protecting minority shareholders.166  The 
appraisal remedy was seen by them as a means of deterring insiders from participating 
in inequitable conduct, and of remedying the position of minority shareholders who 
found themselves unwillingly drawn into fundamental transactions such as cash-out 
mergers, where the acquiring company purchases the target company's shares for 
cash instead of offering shares in the acquiring company as consideration.167 
The statutory appraisal remedy in Delaware Corporation Law permits a shareholder 
who objects to a fundamental change to commence an appraisal proceeding to 
                                               
163 Idem at 615. 
164 Manning op cit note 8 at 261. 
165 Mahoney PG and Weinstein M 'The appraisal remedy and merger premiums' (1999) 1 American Law 
and Economics Review 239 at 239; the American Bar Association Committee on Corporate Laws 
Model Business Corporation Act Annotated (Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data 
2005) at 13 - 20, notes that approximately half of the states have enacted market exceptions to their 
appraisal statutes.  
166 Wertheimer op cit note 45 at 621.  
167 Idem at 616. 
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determine the "fair value" of the shares of all the dissenting shareholders.168  Typically, 
the term "fair value" was not defined in state legislation other than to provide that it is to 
be determined immediately before the effectuation of corporate action, and that any 
appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of the corporate action is to be excluded.169    
Whilst the term "fair value" itself does not provide any guidance to the courts on what 
method to use, a substantial precedent built up prior to 1983 in support of the use of 
the Delaware block method as the standard method of valuation.170  This was 
predominantly because of the Delaware courts' desire for an analytical framework in 
which the valuation judgments of court-appointed appraisers could be identified and 
reviewed by the courts.171  The Delaware block method, however, was roundly 
criticised as doing a poor job of protecting minority shareholders and failing to accord 
with current financial valuation techniques.172  As a result minority shareholders in the 
US were inclined to rely on other remedies as a form of redress in situations of 
fundamental change, such as a breach of the directors' fiduciary duties towards the 
company.  
All was to change in the pivotal 1983 decision of Weinberger v UOP.173  Although the 
claim in Weinberger v UOP centred on an alleged breach of a fiduciary duty by the 
board of a merger target, the Supreme Court of Delaware chose to consider the use of 
the appraisal remedy in protecting minority shareholders.174  In what can be considered 
a watershed dictum, the Court held that in subsequent proceedings dissenting 
shareholders should rather look to the appraisal remedy as a form of redress, instead 
of relying on a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.175  To encourage the use of this 
approach, the Court held that exclusive reliance on the standard Delaware block 
method of valuation should be abandoned in favour of a more "liberal approach" that:  
…includes proof of value by any techniques or methods which are generally considered 
acceptable in the financial community and otherwise admissible in court…[which] will 
                                               
168 See s 262 (a) and (e) of the Delaware Corporation Law Del. Code Ann tit 8. 
169 Wertheimer op cit note 45 at 626. 
170 Hamermesh & Wachter op cit note 116 at 124.   
171 Idem at 5, citing Jacques Coe & Co. v Minneapolis-Moline Co. 75 A.2d 244 246 Del Ch (1950). 
172 Wertheimer op cit note 45 at 625 & Thompson op cit note 130 at 463. 
173 457 A.2d 701 Del (1983).  
174 Thompson op cit note 130 at 463. 
175 Ibid. 
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obviate the very structured and mechanistic procedure that has heretofore governed such 
matters.176 
The Court was intentionally vague about the exact measure of determining fair value 
but stressed that "fair price obviously requires consideration of all relevant factors 
involving the value of a company".177  The Court was clear, however, that in 
determining fair value based on the relevant factors: 
"only the speculative elements of value that may arise from the accomplishment or 
expectation of the merger are excluded,…but elements of future value, including the 
nature of the enterprise, which are known or susceptible of proof as of the date of the 
merger and not the product of speculation may be considered".178   
It is worth noting that this approach accords with the approach adopted in Sammel v 
President Brand Gold Mining Co Limited.179  Furthermore, it is significant that in the 
Weinberger v UOP case, the plaintiff's investment analyst used both the DCF method 
and a relative valuation model to value the company.180   
The effect of Weinberger v UOP was to restore the appraisal remedy as a means for 
minority shareholders to challenge a merger and, most importantly for our purposes, 
profoundly change the process of determining the "fair value" of shares by making it, in 
the opinion of American jurists, both reasonable and workable.181  State legislatures 
followed the lead of Weinberger v UOP by passing amendments to corporate 
legislation to encourage the use of the appraisal remedy by minority shareholders who 
risk being cashed-out at an unsatisfactory price.182  All of these developments 
combined to result in an uptick of appraisal-related activity in the United States. 
Since Weinberger v UOP the decisions of the Delaware Court of Chancery have 
tended to favour the DCF technique as the foremost method of valuing shares under 
the appraisal remedy.183  In particular, in the case of Cede & Co. v Technicolor, Inc184, 
                                               
176 Weinberger case supra note 173 at 712 - 713.  
177 Idem at 713. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Sammel case supra note 76. 
180 Thompson op cit note 130 at 463. 
181 Wertheimer op cit note 45 at 617. 
182 Mahoney and Weinstein op cit note 165 at 257.  
183 Hamermesh & Wachter op cit note 118 at 1027 & Hamermesh & Wachter op cit note 116 at 124. 
184 Supra note 131. 
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the Court recognised the discount cash flow method in theory as the single best 
method to estimate the value of an economic asset and acknowledged that this method 
had become prominent with the implicit encouragement of the Weinberger v UOP 
judgment.185  This is no coincidence given that the DCF analysis resonates with the 
current generation of business students who consider it the pre-eminent approach to 
valuing assets.186   
Notwithstanding that the DCF method it is the most prominent and frequently used 
valuation technique of the Delaware courts, it needs to be stressed that it is not the 
exclusive means of determining fair value. 187  The courts in the United States have 
used a variety of methods to determine fair value; the choice of method normally 
dictated by the circumstances in the case and being highly dependent on the evidence 
tendered by the parties.188  Relative valuation methods, NAV and book value, as well 
as combinations of valuation methods have all been used by US courts following the 
Weinberger v UOP judgment.  There are, however, a number of Delaware judgments 
that have held that the liquidation value of the company's assets should not be used as 
the exclusive method of determining the fair value of a dissenter's shares.189   
A number of valuation principles have also percolated from the Delaware case law. 
First, it has been made clear that "fair value" excludes any gains or potential gains 
arising from the merger.190  This principle is similar to the conclusion in Sammel v 
President Brand Gold Mining Co Limited191 that was considered above.  Control 
premiums are generally not a consideration in appraisal proceedings in the United 
States, as appraisal statutes invariably require the share valuation to be based on the 
value of the company prior to the proposed fundamental change.192  Shareholders are 
also not entitled to share in the anticipated benefits of the fundamental change.193 
                                               
185 Idem at 7. 
186 Hamermesh & Wachter op cit note 118 at 1027 - 1028. 
187 Thompson op cit note 130 at 464. 
188 Wertheimer op cit note 45 at 628. 
189 Hamermesh & Wachter op cit note 116 at 151. 
190 Idem at 31. 
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192 Idem at 31. 
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Furthermore, in the cases of Cavalier Oil Corp v Harnett 194 and In re Appraisal of Shell 
Oil Co195 it was held that the aim of the appraisal remedy is to determine the value of 
the corporation as a whole and then to award the dissenter with the value of his shares 
on a pro rata basis.  Thus the shares that a minority shareholder owns are legally equal 
to each and every other share of the same class and there is no reason to award the 
minority a lesser value for those shares merely because the minority does not exercise 
control of the company.196  In other words, there is no justification for applying a 
minority discount to a dissenter's shares in appraisal proceedings.   
Courts have acknowledged, however, that in some situations it would be appropriate to 
apply a marketability discount to a dissenter's shares where such discount would apply 
to all the shares of a company if they were sold.197 
Chapter 13 of the Model Business Corporation Act198 ("MBCA") in the United States 
provides minority shareholders with an appraisal right in a number of situations of 
fundamental change.  The MBCA is prepared by the Committee on Corporate Laws of 
the American Bar Association for use by state legislatures as a basis for revision of the 
state's corporation law or is adopted by the state legislature in its entirety.199  What is 
most striking from a South African perspective is that the MBCA provides an appraisal 
remedy in the event of a merger, share exchange, sale of assets or upon certain 
amendments to the articles of incorporation.200  These trigger events are the same or 
similar to the trigger events in section 164(2) of the Companies Act 2008.201 
It should be noted though that the recommended provisions of the MCBA are not 
slavishly followed by many of the states which have chosen to adopt it.  States have in 
a number of instances chosen to limit the number of triggering events for the appraisal 
                                               
194 564 A.2d 1137 1144 Del (1989).   
195 607 A.2d 1213 1218 Del (1992). 
196 Booth op cit note 46 at 1.  
197 Idem at 5. 
198 Model Business Corporation Act Annotated (4th ed, 2008) adopted and published by the Committee on 
Corporate Laws of the Section of Business Law, with the support of the American Bar Association, 
Section of Business Law. 
199 Goldstein E 'The Revised Model Business Corporation Act: Comment and Observation: Revision of the 
Model Business Corporation Act' (May, 1985) 63 Texas Law Review 1471 at 1471.  
200 § 13.02 (a) (1) - (5) MBCA. 
201 The one comparison which is slightly different is between the MBCA share exchange trigger event and 
the section 114 trigger event (ie schemes of arrangement).  But of course share exchanges are a 
common form of implementing a scheme of arrangement, so in this sense the comparison remains 
true. 
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remedy, for example Delaware restricts the use of the appraisal remedy to events of 
merger or consolidation.202 
If the appraisal right is properly exercised the dissenting shareholder is entitled to the 
fair value of that shareholder's shares, "fair value" being the value of the corporation's 
shares determined (i) using customary and current valuation concepts and techniques 
and generally employed for similar businesses in the context of the transaction 
requiring appraisal; and (ii) without discounting for lack of marketability or minority 
status except, if appropriate, in respect of certain amendments to the articles of 
incorporation.203 
It is noteworthy that the MBCA provides a market-exception where the dissenting 
shareholders can obtain fair value for the shares by selling them in the market. 204 This 
exception is premised on the theory that an efficient market exists and that the markets 
in which the shares are traded is "liquid" and the value of the shares established by the 
appraisal-triggering event is "reliable".205  The market-exception has been adopted by 
approximately half of the states in the United States.206 
5.  South African court appraisals under section 164 of the 
Companies Act 2008 
In view of the different approaches that are likely to be taken in respect of the valuation 
of listed and unlisted shares, this study shall consider each in turn in the South African 
context. 
5.1 Listed shares  
In a judicial appraisal of listed shares pursuant to an application to a court under 
section 164(14) to determine fair value in respect of shares that were subject to a 
dissenter’s demand in terms of section 164(5) to (8), the question that is likely to 
preoccupy a court is whether the circumstances surrounding the triggering action justify 
a departure from the listed market price of those shares at the date on which, and time 
immediately before, the company adopted the resolution giving rise to the triggering 
                                               
202 Wertheimer op cit note 45 at 621. 
203 § 13.01.4(ii) and (iii) MBCA. 
204 § 13.02.(b)(1) MBCA. 
205 American Bar Association op cit note 165 at 13-20. 
206 Ibid. 
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action.207  This is because the listed market price of the shares would prima facie be 
the most persuasive indicator of fair value if the stock market is liquid and reliable at 
the time of the vote.  
After receiving a demand from the dissenting shareholder as contemplated in 
section 164(7), the board must offer an amount considered by the directors to be the 
fair value of the dissenter's shares.208  Presumably this offer would be the higher of (i) 
the offer price under the transaction, if applicable, or (ii) the listed price of the 
dissenting shareholder’s shares at the date on which, and time immediately before, the 
company adopted the resolution.209  Practically speaking, in the context of a 
fundamental transaction involving listed shares, a dissenting shareholder would only 
challenge this offer in court under section 164 (14) if he (i) deems the consideration 
offered in terms of the fundamental transaction inadequate, and (ii) believes that 
neither the listed share price on the day of the resolution nor the current listed price of 
the shares is a true reflection of the company's value.   
There are a number of factors that may convince a court to depart from the listed 
market price as the benchmark for fair value of the dissenter's shares.  In particular, if 
the dissenting shareholder could prove that there was no market for the shares or that 
the share price was artificially depressed as a result of the actions of insiders, the 
offeree or other shareholders, or even because of the announcement of the proposed 
triggering action itself.210  The stock market is a less reliable indicator of value where 
there is an interested transaction or where  there is the potential for self-dealing by a 
controlling shareholder or company insiders.211  But, one also needs to take into 
account that a premium on the stock market price is usually built into the offer price in a 
fundamental transaction.  The premium is the price required to convince a sufficient 
number of different shareholders to pass the relevant resolution.212  It could also be 
                                               
207 Section 164(16) of the Companies Act 2008. 
208 As required by section 164 (11) of the Companies Act 2008. 
209 The author has made this presumption as the board would struggle to justify an offer of a lower amount 
in the event of a challenge given the benchmark set by the listed price or the offer price.    
210 The circumstances surrounding the fundamental change could have been manipulated by insiders, the 
offeree, or by one or more substantial shareholders, with the result that the listed market price of the 
shares as at the date of the resolution, and immediately before it was passed is depressed.  One must 
remember that those in control of a fundamental transaction have the ability to orchestrate the timing 
of the transaction, and the dates of significant events in the transaction, such as the date of the 
general meeting called to pass the resolution and the dates on which material conditions precedent 
are fulfilled.   
211 Seligman op cit note 109 at 840.  
212 Idem at 837. 
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seen as the control premium.  It is arguable that when the appraisal rights are used in 
the protective sense213, the listed share price should be adjusted upwards to take into 
account the inherent minority discount reflected in publicly listed shares.214  As noted 
earlier, minority discounts are usually not applied in court appraisals in the US state of 
Delaware but this could be because of the protective purpose ascribed to the appraisal 
remedy in that state.  If the purpose of the appraisal remedy is purely for liquidity, no 
such adjustment will be required.  Another factor is that the size of the offer itself is 
likely to have a positive effect on the share price prior to the vote.  As a consequence 
the listed price of the shares on the day of, and immediately before, the vote is likely to 
be inflated as a result of the offer.  
Should the court accept that a market value of the shares is inadequate in the 
circumstances, it is submitted that it will follow the same line of enquiry as is taken in 
assessing the fair value of unlisted shares.215   
Nevertheless, one must also remember that fundamental transactions involving public 
companies are affected transactions subject to the Takeover Regulations in Chapter 5 
of the Companies Regulations, 2011 published under the Companies Act 2008.216  
Regulation 110(1) requires the independent board of the offeree regulated company to 
obtain appropriate external advice from an independent expert in the form of a fair and 
reasonable opinion and regulation 90 provides that the offeree regulated company in 
section 112 (proposals to dispose of all or greater part of assets of undertaking) and 
section 113 (proposals for amalgamation or merger) fundamental transactions shall 
retain an independent expert if the Panel so requires. Section 114 also requires the 
company to retain an independent expert to compile a report stating all prescribed 
information relevant to the value of the securities affected by the proposed 
arrangement.217  The independent expert's fair and reasonable opinion and report is 
intended to provide an added safeguard to minority shareholders against an unfair offer 
price.  Obviously such an opinion and report will be acknowledged by a court in a 
                                               
213 Discussed in paragraph 5.3 below. 
214 Wertheimer op cit note 45 at 618. 
215 Which enquiry this dissertation shall consider in paragraph 5.2 below. 
216 Section 118(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 2008.  Private companies are also subject to the Takeover 
Regulations if 10% of the issued securities of the company have been transferred, other than by 
transfer between or among related or inter-related persons, within the period of 24 months 
immediately before the date of the affected transaction (section 118(1)(c)).  The Panel, however, 
usually is willing to exempt an offeror to an affected transaction if the target is a private company on 
the basis of the grounds in section 119(6)(a) - (c).  
217 Sections 114(2) and 114(3)(a). 
 43 
 
section 164(14) application.  It is telling that regulation 90(4) provides that an 
independent expert's valuation of the offeree regulated company must be performed in 
accordance with "generally accepted valuation approaches and methods in use in the 
market from time to time", including:  
a) "capitalisation, income or cash flow approach which relies on the "value-in-use" principle 
and requires determination of the present value of future cash flows over the useful life 
of the asset or business; 
b) comparative or market approach that relies on the principle of "willing buyer, willing 
seller" and requires that the amount obtainable from the sale of an asset or undertaking 
is determined as if in an arm's-length transaction; and 
c) cost approach that relies on historical amounts spent on the asset or undertaking." 
It is significant that regulation 90(4) requires an independent expert to use the DCF 
method, a relative or market approach and a cost approach to determine the value of 
the company. 
It is also worth mentioning that following the introduction of the Companies Act 2008 it 
has become standard practice in affected transactions for the offeror to make its offer 
subject to the suspensive condition that less than 5% of the shareholders exercise 
appraisal rights, such condition being capable of waiver by the offeror.  The purpose of 
such a condition is to obviate the risk of dissenting shareholders frustrating the 
transaction through the exercise of appraisal rights and challenging the company's 
offer in court; it having been acknowledged that judicial appraisal is open to abuse by 
minority shareholders, who may initiate appraisal proceedings only to accept the 
company's offer on or before the court's determination of fair value.218  An example of 
such a suspensive condition can be found in the scheme of arrangement proposed to 
Avusa Limited shareholders in 2012, which made the scheme conditional on not more 
than 5% of the Avusa Limited shareholders exercising their appraisal rights in terms of 
section 164(7) of the Companies Act 2008: 
"within 30 Business Days following the general meeting, […] provided that, in the event 
that Avusa shareholders give notice objecting to the Scheme as contemplated in section 
164(3) of the Companies Act and/or vote against the resolutions proposed at the general 
                                               
218 Cassim op cit note 9 at 805 - 806.  
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meeting in respect of no more than 5% of the Avusa shares, this condition shall be 
deemed to have been fulfilled at the time of the general meeting."219 
The use of this suspensive condition has yet to be challenged under the anti-
avoidance, exemptions and substantial compliance provisions of section 6 of the 
Companies Act 2008.  It is arguable that the prevalence of this suspensive condition in 
fundamental transactions post 1 May 2011 may be the reason why there are no 
reported decisions of section 164 judicial appraisals of publicly-held shares.  
Lastly, if market price is to be the sole basis of valuation, the timing of the valuation or 
the time period considered will be crucial.  Fortunately, the Companies Act 2008 is 
unequivocal on the timing of share valuations.  Section 164(16) stipulates that "the fair 
value must be determined as at the date on which, and time immediately before, the 
company adopted the relevant resolution".  In the context of a market valuation, the 
phrase "time immediately before" appears to indicate that the closing price of shares on 
the date of the announcement is not conclusive if the announcement was made before 
market close.  This requirement would also seem to exclude market valuations based 
on average prices of the shares in question. 
5.2 Unlisted shares 
Given that there is no easily accessible objective indicator of the value of a private 
company's shares, it is suggested that the determination of their fair value for purposes 
of appraisal proceedings is likely to be a contentious matter.   
In view of the points made throughout this dissertation, the choice of valuation method 
applied by a court in a section 164 appraisal will depend largely on the circumstances 
surrounding the triggering action.  Practically, this will be dependent on the evidence 
which is tendered by the parties for purposes of the section 164(14) application.   
There are, however, a number of common threads in the reported cases on court 
appraisals that one can draw upon for guidance.  First, the market value method, while 
persuasive, is susceptible to a host of unpredictable circumstances which tends to 
exclude it as a sole valuation method.  Second, exclusive reliance on the net asset 
value of a company should also be avoided, unless the company is in serious financial 
                                               
219 Paragraph 6.2.4 of the Avusa Limited circular issued to Avusa Limited Shareholders on 18 July 2012 
available at www.timesmedia.co.za/wp-content/.../AVUSA-CIRCULAR-FINAL.pdf
 
 accessed on 
8 January 2014.  
 45 
 
distress.  Third, the prices obtained in the sale of similar businesses of a similar size to 
the company under consideration are persuasive indicators of fair value.  Fourth, 
relative valuation methods such as the earnings multiple approach are useful provided 
there are analogous companies to be used as references and that the applicable 
industry is not positioned at a historical high or low point in its business cycle. Fifth, the 
Delaware block method or a variation thereof should not be used as it has been 
effectively discredited as a valuation method.220  Lastly, judging by international 
financial norms regarding share valuation and the legal sentiment emanating from the 
Delaware courts,221 it would appear that the discounted cash flow method is likely to be 
favoured by the court and court-appointed valuers in the valuation of the dissenters' 
shares, provided there is no legitimate cause to value the company on a liquidation 
basis.   
It is anticipated, however, that more than one valuation method will be used by expert 
valuers when presenting evidence of "fair value" to a court in order to corroborate the 
valuers' findings.  For instance, the earnings multiple approach could be used as a 
sanity check on a DCF valuation.   
It is submitted that the valuation methods and principles in relation to voluntary or 
compulsory sales agreed to by the dissenting shareholders and the company in 
shareholders agreements, or which are provided for in the Memorandum of 
Incorporation, are not to be used for purposes of determining fair value.   
Finally, it is submitted that the most important decision to made in determining fair 
value will be whether to apply a minority discount.  Dissenting shareholders who have 
invested in the company without an expectation of control may be deserving of a 
minority discount.  On the other hand, a minority shareholding in a quasi partnership is 
more likely to avoid the minority discount in section 164 court appraisals.  However, as 
this study will indicate below, the purpose of the appraisal remedy will be a significant 
consideration in assessing the appropriateness of minority discounts or marketability 
discounts in section 164 share appraisals.  Notably, given that the valuation is unlikely 
to factor in gains or potential gains arising from the fundamental transaction, it would 
be inappropriate for the dissenting shareholders to be awarded a share in the control 
premium that accrues to the new controlling shareholder in certain fundamental 
transactions.    
                                               
220 See commentary in paragraph 3.2.5 above. 
221 See paragraphs 3 & 4 above. 
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5.3 The purpose of the remedy and its effect on valuation 
It is submitted that the purpose of the appraisal remedy will be a fundamental 
consideration in section 164 court appraisals.  As this study will explain below, the 
purpose of the appraisal remedy may affect the manner in which the court applies 
valuation principles, in particular, minority discounts, lack of marketability discounts and 
control premiums.  Accordingly, I submit that it will be necessary for a court to 
distinguish the purpose of the appraisal remedy in each situation of judicial appraisal in 
order to justify its valuation.   
Where the purpose of the appraisal remedy is to permit a dissenting shareholder to exit 
the company solely because the fundamentally-changed company does not accord 
with the dissenting shareholder's original investment, it could be said that section 164 
serves a liquidity function.  In this scenario a section 164 court valuation does not 
follow from a finding of prejudice or risk of prejudice.  Instead, the appraisal remedy 
provides a mechanical, morally-neutral process to allow a minority shareholder to exit a 
company that has changed direction against his will.  Moreover, the appraisal remedy 
ensures that the minority will not be prejudiced should he wish to exit, by guaranteeing 
a fair price for his shares.  In this sense the appraisal remedy is seen as the trade-off 
for giving the company more flexibility to pass the resolution giving rise to the triggering 
action.   
Where there is a risk of wrongful conduct by insiders or controlling shareholder(s) in a 
triggering action or where the triggering action results in the minority shareholders 
being forced to sell their shares or their rights being significantly diluted against their 
will, the appraisal remedy can serve a more protective purpose.  It does so by acting as 
a safety net, ensuring that minority shareholders will always receive fair value, 
notwithstanding the wrongful or prejudicial conduct of other actors.  This safety net can 
operate to discourage insiders or controlling shareholders from acting wrongfully in 
relation to triggering actions and minimise the risk of prejudice to minority shareholders 
who may be significantly diluted or squeezed-out as a result of the triggering action.  If 
Delaware case law is any indication, we are likely to see the appraisal remedy used for 
the purpose of protecting dissenting minority shareholders in fundamental acquisitions 
where the dissenting minority shareholders are forced, against their will, to sell all or 
some of their shares to a purchaser pursuant to a resolution passed by the majority of 
shareholders.   
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It is worth noting that section 164(15)(c)(ii) requires the court to determine a fair value 
in respect of the shares of all the dissenting shareholders.  Accordingly, there will be no 
scope for the court to examine the particular circumstances of each of the dissenting 
shareholders.  If inequitable conduct is to influence the valuation it will have to affect 
the dissenters generally. 
Where the purpose of the appraisal remedy is simply to provide a liquidity function, the 
established case law on court valuations under section 252 and section 440K of the 
Companies Act 1973 is likely to be unpersuasive, given that those valuations were 
performed in response to actual or potential prejudice.222  Inversely, it is submitted that 
the established rules developed and applied in section 252 and section 440K judicial 
appraisals are likely to be instructive when the purpose of an appraisal remedy is to 
protect minorities. 
With respect, I do not agree with the contention of Cassim223 that the factors and 
considerations applicable to court valuations under section 252 and section 440K of the 
Companies Act 1973 cannot be applied to court valuations under the appraisal remedy 
because the former do not involve a willing seller.  It is possible that the appraisal 
remedy may be used in situations where a dissenting shareholder is forced to sell all or 
some of his shares against his will pursuant to a triggering action.  For example, 
schemes of arrangement in terms of section 114 and mergers under section 113 that 
involve an offer for a portion or the entire issued share capital not already held by the 
offeror will, if approved by the shareholders, result in the dissenting shareholders being 
forced to sell their shares to the offeror against their will.  In these situations the 
appraisal remedy is relied upon to ensure that a fair price is obtained for the dissenter's 
shares.  In short, the dissenting shareholder is still being forced out against his will but 
may rely on the appraisal remedy to correct the offer consideration to the extent it is 
unfair.    
Moreover, section 252 share appraisals were used to remedy the position of the 
minority shareholder who suffered prejudice at the hands of the company or a person 
related to the company.  It is submitted that parallels can be drawn between the aims of 
these different appraisal proceedings.   
                                               
222 Cassim op cit note 9 at 809 para 16.13.5. 
223  Ibid. See also Cassim MF op cit note 23 at 168.  
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If the appraisal remedy serves a protective function a court is likely to refrain from 
applying a minority discount or marketability discount to a dissenter's shares.  Failure to 
accord a minority shareholder the full proportionate value of his shares would impose a 
penalty for lack of control and could potentially enrich the majority shareholders who 
would reap a windfall from the appraisal.224  This clearly would be unacceptable in 
situations where a minority deserves to be protected, such as those situations where 
the dissenting shareholder is forced to sell his shares against his will or his rights are at 
risk of being diminished or adversely affected as a result of a triggering action.  As was 
seen in the section 252 and section 440K decisions, a minority discount is 
inappropriate where the minority shareholder has been forced out or was materially 
prejudiced by the behaviour of the company.   
On the other hand, if the application of the appraisal remedy is solely to provide 
liquidity (in the absence of a risk of wrongful conduct or prejudice), the application of a 
minority discount or marketability discount to the relevant shares may be appropriate, 
as the appraisal remedy in this context is simply aiming to replicate a realistic market 
for the shares. 
5.4 Problems with expert valuers 
One of the primary difficulties that will face a court in section 164 appraisal proceedings 
is having to navigate the opinions of different expert valuers to reach a fair value of the 
dissenters' shares.  It has been recognised that the expert valuations put forward by 
each party in appraisal proceedings are prone to partiality given that expert valuers are 
hired to produce a valuation complimentary to their client’s case.  This lack of 
impartiality can be blamed for divergent outcomes even when the same methodologies 
are applied by the expert valuers.225 A good example is the manner in which the choice 
of future cash flow assumptions can produce radically different valuations under the 
DCF valuation method.  Experts' testimony is likely to diverge even further where 
different valuation methodologies are applied. 
This concern was echoed in US judgment of MPM Enterprises, Inc v Gilbert226, which 
noted the following: 
                                               
224Cavalier Oil Corp v Harnett supra note 194 at 1145.  
225 Idem at 630. 
226 No. 14416, 709 A.2d 663 Del Ch Lexis 141 (1997). 
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One might expect the experts' desire to convince the Court of the reasonableness and 
validity of their assumptions and financial models would produce a somewhat narrow 
range of values, clearly and concisely supported, despite the individual parties' obvious 
conflicting incentives.  Unfortunately […] one should not put much faith in that 
expectation, at least when faced with appraisal experts in this Court. 
The more credible opinion of the various opinions submitted by expert valuers is likely 
to be accepted by the court as reflecting "fair value".  But a court is not bound to 
choose between expert valuations.  A court could justifiably construct its own valuation 
based on the experts' testimony.  The key to this dilemma may be for the court to 
appoint an independent valuer to value the shares.  Indeed, section 164(15)(c)(iii)(aa) 
grants the court the discretion to appoint one or more appraisers to assist it in 
determining the fair value in respect of the shares.   
A court must nevertheless guard against placing too much reliance on the independent 
expert's testimony.227  The responsibility to determine fair value is the court’s alone and 
cannot be delegated.  Moreover, the court must be mindful that appointed experts will 
ratchet up the costs of the application and may extend the duration of the proceedings 
unnecessarily.228  Thus a court-appointed independent expert may not always be 
appropriate in section 164 appraisal proceedings and the powers in 
section 164(15)(c)(iii)(aa) must be exercised with due regard to the rights and justifiable 
expectations of the parties to the appraisal proceedings.   
6. Conclusion 
With the introduction of any new statutory legal mechanism into our law there is always 
going to be a degree of uncertainty as to how it will be interpreted and applied by the 
courts.  The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate and consider the sources that 
are likely to influence the courts in determining the fair value of dissenters' shares in 
appraisal proceedings.   
It is submitted that the courts are expected to rely on the significant wellspring of case 
law from Delaware, especially in the context of fundamental transactions.  As a result, 
earnings valuation methods are likely to take a pre-eminent position in the valuation of 
dissenters' shares.  Other valuation methods, or a combination of valuation methods, 
                                               
227 Wertheimer op cit note 45 at 701. 
228 Ibid. 
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may be applied should the circumstances of the case demand them, provided always 
that they meet the requirement of being generally considered acceptable in the 
financial community and otherwise admissible in court.  In particular, stock market 
prices will be a reliable indicator of the value of listed public company shares but will 
not be conclusive evidence of the shares' true value and may need to be adjusted 
upwards to take into account the minority discount inherent in the listed share price.   
Further, it is submitted that the court's interpretation of the purpose of the appraisal 
remedy is likely to influence the application of valuation methods and principles by the 
court.  The purpose of the appraisal remedy will also determine whether it is 
appropriate to rely on past South African judgements involving judicial appraisals.  It is 
suggested that to the extent that the triggering action involves the risk of inequitable 
conduct or the prejudice of minority shareholders, the decisions of our courts in share 
valuations under section 252 and section 440K  applications under the Companies Act 
1973 may provide valuable assistance to courts in appraisal proceedings under 
section 164.  Furthermore, the wealth of case law in the United Kingdom in respect of 
the corresponding sections of United Kingdom Companies Acts, past and present, 
should also prove to be a useful repository.  It is submitted that the application of 
minority discounts, in particular, will depend on the purpose of the appraisal remedy. 
Finally, it is submitted that the expense of initiating and proceeding with a judicial 
appraisal is likely to affect the use of the appraisal remedy by minority shareholders.  In 
respect of fundamental transactions involving offer consideration, there is also the risk 
that the court appraisal could be stalled by the company, leaving the dissenting 
shareholder empty-handed for the period in question whilst the non-dissenting 
shareholders receive the offer consideration.  Given these drawbacks and other 
uncertainties highlighted in this dissertation, it is submitted that dissenting shareholders 
are likely to discount the "fair value" of their shares to take into account the risk that the 
court valuation will not meet their expectations, leading them to accept an offer from 
the company that meets or exceeds their own discounted valuation of their shares.   
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